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ATTACHMENT

Draft/Compartmentation Review Team
9 July 1971

ASSUMPTIONS

--There is a need for compartmentation of certain kinds of U. S.

intelligence activities, operations and products, and
information on them; the question being "what kinds, how many
and the impacts."

--The examination and study of CIA uses of compartmented systems
will center in areas where the aegis for such compartmentation
lies solely within the Agency or other U. S. and Allied intelligence
organizations, activities and operations, for example:

- Signals Intelligence, inclusive of 2nd and 3rd Party
activities and products.
- Talent-keyhole [REDACTED]
- Other "bigot-list" type program and project categories;

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- Research and development program and project
controls.
- Various processing and production program and
project controls.

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- Systematic Agency use of dissemination controls such as "internal use only," "no foreign dissemination," "limited distribution," "controlled dissemination" and "no dissemination abroad" will be examined.
- Authorities for the establishment and application of communications security (COMSEC) classifications will not be challenged, however it is pertinent to the examination to understand the basis for employment of any particular cryptographic system or channel which is or may be used to maintain compartmentation.
- Compartmentation of "Covert Action" programs and projects, and specific Clandestine Service collection operations are not involved in this review.
- Statutory and Executive Order authorities for the establishment and application of government-wide security classifications of "confidential," "secret," and "top secret" will not be challenged and are not involved in this review.
- Statutory authorities for the establishment and application of the atomic energy security classification "restricted data" will not be challenged and are not involved in this review.

THE TASKS

- Identification of all compartmented systems in use or planned, other than those excluded in the foregoing statement of "Assumptions." Any systems not otherwise identified and considered in the examination and study will not be approved for continued use.
- Identification of the authority for the establishment and use of compartmented systems under examination.
- Analysis of the policies, criteria, standards, regulations, procedures, arrangements, and services in use for the several compartmented systems identified:
 - In CIA at the Headquarters level.
 - In CIA at field levels, domestic and overseas.
 - In contractors of CIA.
 - Involving CIA with intelligence operations of other U. S. departments and agencies.
 - Involving CIA with intelligence services of foreign countries.
- Understanding of the purposes served, the degrees of success achieved, and any secondary advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of compartmented systems and system retention criteria.

- Identification and assessment of the risks to security of sensitive information and to sources and methods by the possible removal of each compartmentation category identified or by the simplification of control procedures and related processes for some or all of existing intelligence compartmentation systems.
- Identification in approximate terms of savings in manpower, equipment, and space which could be achieved in direct support cost areas with appropriate reductions in compartmentation or simplification in control procedures.
- Preparation and submission of report, including findings and recommendations, in accordance with the "Terms of Reference."

OBJECTIVES

- To identify, through examination and study, possibilities for the reduction of compartmentation of intelligence activities and products by the elimination of separate compartments, control procedures, courier and communication channels, sanitization operations, and personnel access registries where these are not fully justified for maintaining essential security of sensitive U. S. information, sensitive sources and methods, and the achievements of intelligence particularly in relation to specific sources and methods.
- To anticipate a possible need for a unified Director of Central Intelligence policy for the security of intelligence sources and methods, based on appropriate criteria and standards; and an improved action mechanism by which the Director can ensure the establishment and maintenance of essential compartments of intelligence activities, operations and products, and on a continuing basis, by which he can preclude the initiation or retention of undesirable compartmentation in CIA and the Intelligence Community.